After more than a year of continuous U.S. bombardment of Houthi forces, one of the most critical battles in Yemen’s decade-long civil war seems like it is about to take place. Current reports suggest that up to 80,000 personnel –  backed by American & Emirati air support – have been mobilized by the internationally recognized Government of Yemen and other anti-houthi groups, in a bid to launch a decisive blow against the Houthi rebels. The most likely target: the strategic port city of Hodeidah. Hodeidah rests on the coast of the Red Sea and has played a critical role in the Houthis campaign against commercial shipping vessels transiting the Red Sea. Hodeidah is a strategic hub, situated on the country’s west coast, that handles up to 70% of Yemen’s imports and 80% of its humanitarian aid. It is a critical area that the internationally recognized government must control if it wishes to usurp the Houthis. The offensive, should it be launched, would be the largest military operation since the start of the Yemeni civil war, potentially reshaping the map of the country and changing the course of the brutal decade long war. If successful, it could set the stage for a showdown over Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, which has been under Houthi control since 2014.

The importance of Hodeidah stems from its role as the primary source of imported food, fuel, and humanitarian aid to Yemen, making it a vital city to control. The port also serves as a key logistical hub for the Houthis, who have controlled Hodeidah since 2014 and use its facilities to generate financial revenue streams through illicit trade and extortion. The Governorate of Hodeidah holds an extensive production and logistics network belonging to the Houthis, which is a key factor behind the Houthis’ ability to project their power into the Red Sea and sustain prolonged military campaigns. These facilities produce and modify missiles and drones, often with Iranian technical support. This network has been used to launch near constant attacks on commercial shipping and military assets in the Red Sea over the past year. Key sites include the Al-Hafa Military Complex, a hub for assembling drones and refurbishing ballistic missiles, such as the Qaher-1, and the Ras Issa Storage Depot, which is used to store Iranian-supplied weapons that are smuggled via the Red Sea or Oman. Hodeidah has been a key target in the recent series of U.S. airstrikes, and the Yemeni government sees Hodeidah as a critical target that must be captured if they want to weaken the Houthis both economically and militarily. Capturing Hodeidah would not only disrupt their supply lines, incredibly limit their ability to carry out attacks on the Red Sea shipping, but also provide a staging ground for an offensive toward Sana’a.

The offensive is being coordinated by the Presidential Leadership Council, a patchwork of Yemeni groups who all wish to defeat the Houthis and liberate the areas under their control. According to Dr. Saeed Sager, a military analyst, the approximately 80,000 personnel being mobilized for the offensive represent the majority of non-Houthi forces in Yemen. The offensive will likely be coordinated by Sagheer bin Aziz, the Chief of Staff of the Yemeni Armed Forces, Tariq Saleh, the leader of the National Resistance Forces, and Aidarus al-Zubaidi, the head of the Southern Transitional Council. The operation will likely be assisted under Operation Rough Rider, launched by President Trump on March 15th, which has conducted over 800 airstrikes, most of which have targeted Hodeidah, Sa’dah, and Sana’a Governorates. Private U.S. military contractors are already reported to be on the ground advising Yemeni forces. The Yemeni National Army, specifically the 5th and 7th Military Regions, alongside the Giants Brigades and the National Resistance Forces, will likely lead the offensive.

The Logistics of the Houthis are overseen by Abdul Rahman al-Mutairi, a logistical expert who coordinates weapons smuggling and distribution with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp. His network has enabled the Houthis to replenish losses despite the incredibly intense U.S. and coalition bombardment, and is the primary reason why U.S. strikes have seen minimal success and been largely ineffective. Key facilities such as Al-Hafa and Ras Issa have been hit repeatedly by U.S. strikes in recent weeks in an attempt to disrupt Houthi supply lines prior to any possible ground offensive. The Houthis appear to be anticipating the upcoming offensive and have been fortifying their positions around the Hodeidah International Airport. Reports seem to indicate that they’ve been placing IEDs and mines across the area, particularly around At Tuhayta, Al Fazah, Zabid, and the city of Hodeidah itself. The Houthi defense will likely be led by Mohammed al-Qadri, the commander of the Coastal Defense Forces, an individual who is responsible for coordinating ASBM and UAV attacks on shipping, alongside Abdul Malik al-Zakari, who serves as the head of the 3rd Military District in Hodeidah, and is responsible for managing ground defenses, including mobile missile launchers and fortified positions across the city. Recent U.S. strikes have killed hundreds of Houthi members, dozens belonging to the 3rd Military District or the Coastal Defense Forces specifically.

The planned offensive on Hodeidah would face some significant challenges, reminiscent of the ones the 2018 Hodeidah Campaign had, which stalled due to international pressure over civilian casualties, culminating in the Stockholm Agreement which established a fragile ceasefire between the Houthis and the Government. A new offensive would risk having the same impact on the civilian population, especially around the Houthis’ entrenched defenses near the Hodeidah International Airport, and along the Hodeidah Port. U.S. airstrikes have already caused civilian casualties which have prompted backlash from Houthi journalists, highlighting the death toll in an attempt to rally popular support against the airstrikes. While casualties have so far been minimal, any ground offensive would cause significantly more civilian casualties than the air campaign, especially considering Hodeidah’s ports, are critical for aid delivery. However, should the offensive be highly successful, it would likely improve the humanitarian situation in the long run, as the Hodeidah Port could be re-activated and use its full potential for aid distribution. A successful offensive could prompt the United Nations to restart its aid distribution campaign in Hodeidah and the captured territories in Northern Yemen, something that has been stopped following the kidnapping of several UN staffers by the Houthis.

If the offensive is successful, it could significantly cripple the Houthis’ economic and military power, forcing them to stop the attacks on the Red Sea and weakening their grip on Northern Yemen. It would also bolster the Yemeni government's legitimacy and strengthen US, Emirati, and Saudi influence in the region. If successful the offensive would also be a further blow to Iran's already heavily depleted influence and proxy strategy in the Middle East.

An offensive would not be without risks, any failure on the behalf of Government backed forces would be a critical blow to any influence and international support for their cause. However, with extensive Western support and backing, and facing an already depleted Houthi opponent, the benefits of a successful operation seem to outweigh the risks. If successful, yet another Iranian proxy will be significantly weakened. There would also be the potential to bring must-needed humanitarian aid and relief to the Yemeni people, many of whom have suffered immensely from the war. If the offensive were to succeed it may just signal the beginning of the end of one of the most brutal conflicts of the 21st century.